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Author(s): David H. Price

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# HOW THE CIA AND PENTAGON HARNESSED ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND COLD WAR WITH LITTLE CRITICAL NOTICE

David H. Price

Department of Sociology/Anthropology, Saint Martin's University,  
5300 Pacific Ave SE, OM 309, Lacey, WA 98503 USA. Email: [dprice@stmartin.edu](mailto:dprice@stmartin.edu)

KEY WORDS: Cold War anthropology, CIA, History of anthropology

*This paper explores a broad range of ways in which anthropological research was linked to military and intelligence agencies during the Cold War, and it examines evidence and implications of the 1976 findings by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (chaired by Senator Frank Church) that during the 1950s and 1960s “massive” amounts of international research were covertly funded by the CIA. The reasons anthropologists did not more critically consider why or how their work aligned with the interests of the CIA and Pentagon are considered, and the implications of post–World War II disciplinary decisions to ignore political dimensions of research in favor of ethical considerations are discussed.*

THIS PAPER BEGINS WITH A BRIEF OVERVIEW of a range of ways in which American anthropologists' work aligned with military and intelligence agencies during the Second World War and the early years of the Cold War, but the main question I explore examines how early Cold War anthropologists came so easily to align their work with the interests of the Pentagon and CIA without questioning the impact of this alignment on the discipline.

Throughout anthropology's history, ethnographers' familiarity with the populations with whom they shared their lives has led to recurrent relationships of trust. Yet as with all forms of intimacy, familiarity creates vulnerabilities. In the discipline's earliest days there were no professional ethics codes offering guidance on how to balance desires to acquire information with the vulnerabilities this knowledge created. Sometimes informal, individual assumptions of trust and honor guided anthropologists' interactions; other times, studied peoples' knowledge was exploited. These early years of anthropology seldom produced reflections on the political context and power differentials between anthropologists and research subjects. Recurrent efforts to use ethnographic knowledge to manage people during wars or occupations have long drawn the American military to seek anthropological expertise. As far back as the Indian Wars, the U.S. military and Department of the Interior used ethnographic knowledge to assist in what we would now recognize as “counterinsurgency operations” by using knowledge of Indian groups to assist in the deployment of counterinsurgency techniques as native groups were cordoned off, moved, and isolated in camps and reservations.

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It was the divided loyalties of anthropologists in wartime, split between serving the needs of the subjects of their research and the needs of military and intelligence agency sponsors, that eventually birthed American anthropology's first professional ethics codes after the Second World War. In a very real, historical sense, war was a force that gave anthropology ethics—tellingly, anthropologists' previous roles assisting in the colonial subjugation of native peoples had not produced codified ethics statements (Price 2011:11–31).

When the United States entered the Second World War, large numbers of American anthropologists, like so many other citizens, joined the war effort. There was initially a small moment of professional hesitancy, perhaps linked to memories of the fallout from Boas' condemnation of using anthropology for spying at the end of the First World War, but within a year, at least half of American anthropologists were actively working for the war effort (Price 2008:18–24). Anthropologists were highly sought out, as they undertook activities ranging from jungle survival training to running covert operations behind enemy lines. The Smithsonian Institution housed the wartime Ethnogeographic Board, which collected a braintrust of anthropologists, geographers, and natural history scholars who mined the documentary resources of the museum and Library of Congress to assist military and intelligence agencies' planning operations. Other anthropologists used their linguistic skills to develop rapid language acquisition curricula for teaching military personnel the languages needed for the many battlefields of the Pacific, Asia, North Africa, and Europe. Anthropological linguist Morris Swadesh developed an innovative series of pocket phrasebooks for soldiers and officers heading to distant lands—phrase books that would become the basis of the Berlitz Language Series in the postwar period. Anthropologists such as Ralph Linton, Kenneth Emory, and Felix Keesing taught war-related classes at university campuses, with courses ranging from regional cultural sensitivity training to special survival skills. Much of this work was only slightly different from the normal activities of university-based anthropology professors (Price 2008).

Some anthropologists worked on domestic counterinsurgency programs: for example, Philleo Nash worked for a special White House program that tracked and suppressed African American racial and labor uprisings across the country (Price 2008:136–38). More than a dozen American anthropologists worked in the War Relocation Authority (WRA) camps, most of them implementing programs designed to undermine resistance by interned Japanese American citizens who had legitimate complaints, though a few WRA anthropologists (e.g., the Opler brothers) assisted internees' efforts to resist the conditions of unjust interment (Price 2008:143–70).

At the Office of War Information, Clyde and Florence Kluckhohn, John Embree, Ruth Benedict, and a half dozen other anthropologists designed Japanese surrender leaflets, monitored Japanese media, and wrote cultural analysis that informed the postwar occupation (Price 2008:171–99). At the Office of Strategic Services (the CIA's wartime predecessor), more than a dozen anthropologists ran field missions around the globe—for example, Gregory Bateson and Cora DuBois were in southern Asia, Carleton Coon ran an OSS band of anti-Nazi insurgents in North Africa, Jack Harris and William Bascom spied on Nazi diamond smugglers in

South Africa—and more than two dozen anthropologists were intelligence analysts at the OSS's Research and Analysis Division (Price 2008:171–99, 220–61).

Examining the specific actions of hundreds of World War II anthropologists in my book *Anthropological Intelligence*, I found that while most anthropologists' wartime contributions would likely be considered ethical by contemporary standards, a minority of contributions crossed lines of disciplinary propriety. To cite but one extreme example, medical anthropologists working on an OSS project searched for uniquely "Japanese" biological features that could be exploited by a "race-specific" biological weapon (see Price 2008:222–29). Though no anthropological ethics codes existed during the war, some anthropologists violated not only the assumed trust of studied populations to not use anthropological knowledge against them but also what would become, in the postwar, post-Nuremberg era, the baseline for ethical research on human populations.

For many Americans, then and today, the justness and necessity of the cause of fighting Nazi totalitarianism mitigated critical discussions of what it meant politically and ethically for anthropology to be so directly harnessed to military campaigns. Somewhere in the processes of avoiding such discussions, American anthropologists' beliefs about the political justness of fighting Nazi oppression became uncritically enmeshed in general conceptions of applying anthropology in subsequent wars. At the same time, many anthropologists did not untangle the fundamental political and moral differences between using anthropology in support of, and in opposition to, Nazi tyranny.

As a group, American anthropologists did little at the war's end to try to understand what the war ethically or politically had meant to the discipline. For most, it was just something that had to be done, and then it ended. However, the Society for Applied Anthropology came out of the war clearly understanding the need for ethical limits, and they established the first anthropological ethics code in 1948 (Mead et al. 1949; Price 2008:272–78). At the war's end, a silence about their war work developed that today feels like a preoccupation with mastering the postwar world, with shades of disciplinary-PTSD, as veterans returned in silence from the bloodletting and tried to get on with their lives. This short-lived postwar, pre-Cold War liminal world revealed ways that wartime understandings of anthropology's alignments with military needs would become normalized, silent features of the coming Cold War's ambience.

As America entered the Cold War slipstream, most anthropologists did not clearly shift their thinking about the causes their nation now supported, even though America's Cold War policy shifted from liberating occupations to strategies of patron-client relations, securing cheap labor, and undermining democratic movements threatening the economic interests of American markets.

### **EXAMPLES OF EARLY COLD WAR ANTHROPOLOGY'S LINKAGE WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE**

My current research moves beyond studying anthropologists in the Second World War and now documents a long list of Cold War connections between anthropologists, the Pentagon, and the CIA—and how slow mental shifts, retaining

World War mental templates for understanding the national purpose in the new Cold War, had a significant impact on the ways in which anthropology developed in tandem with America's "national security state."

It is beyond the scope of this paper to present a detailed history of *why* it is so problematic to align anthropology with the interests of the CIA and Pentagon. Other scholars and I have published works documenting how these agencies have historically undermined the independence and academic freedom needed for the critical pursuit of knowledge; like the threats of increased corporatization on our campuses, the environments of secrecy, non-disclosure, and non-attribution accompanying these relationships are antithetical to the open and critical pursuit of academic knowledge (Diamond 1992; Giroux 2007; Mills 1991; Price n.d.; Roelofs 2003). But just as important for many anthropologists—given the CIA's long history of undermining democratic movements hostile to American corporate interests; supporting a long list of brutal dictators; using assassinations, bribes, kidnappings, and torture as acceptable means to political ends—is the CIA's institutional history which finds itself recurrently in opposition to anthropologists' political and ethical commitments that align us with the peoples we study (Blum 2003; Jeffreys-Jones 1989). If the CIA were simply an intelligence agency, collecting information needed by American leaders to make wise decisions, the addition of anthropological voices to this knowledge pool might make sense, but given the agency's historical role in creating and propping up American-backed dictators from the Shah of Iran to Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, most contemporary anthropologists understand that CIA alignments betray trusts, undermine loyalties, and (more practically) create insurmountable fieldwork difficulties. It is natural that many individual anthropologists have developed critiques along these lines, yet anthropological institutions resist formalizing these political positions as their own.

My current Cold War research has a very broad scope and draws on archival research and extensive use of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to release CIA and Pentagon documents. I am examining hundreds of Cold War anthropology interactions, ranging from the simple but profound impacts on choices of regional studies shaped by the availability of Title VI (of the National Defense Education Act of 1958) funds for specific language study to connections between the CIA and anthropologists conducting fieldwork in foreign countries. From the end of the Second World War until the end of the Cold War, American anthropologists had broad connections with military and intelligence organizations. I'm not sure which is more surprising—the size and scope of these connections, or the lack of careful scholarship documenting the impacts these links had on the discipline.

Sociologist Sigmund Diamond observed that Cold War-era universities warmly welcomed intelligence and military agencies as "invited guest in campuses and quadrangles, and there is precious little evidence that the universities objected to, or even thought much about, the price that was being exacted for the benefits they sought. In a sense, a great potlatch was being celebrated: the government brought gifts, highly visible ones; the universities also brought gifts, research results in permissible areas" (Diamond 1992:275). Academics might

naturally expect administrators to welcome anyone bearing gifts, yet the fact that anthropologists paid so little attention to the meaning of this localized potlatch is remarkable (see Price 2003b).

During the 1960s and early 1970s, journalistic revelations of CIA covert interference in domestic politics and academic research led to presidential commissions and congressional investigations (Hersh 1974; *Newsweek* 1967; Stern 1967). The U.S. Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence clarified the extent of the CIA's covert influence on American academics, and in 1976 the Church Committee (chaired by Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho) concluded that the CIA's interference with academic research was "massive," and that during the 1960s, "CIA funding was involved in nearly half the grants the non-"Big Three" [e.g., Rockefeller, Carnegie, Ford] foundations made . . . in the field of international activities" (Church Committee 1976:182–83). Thirty-five years later, little serious effort has been expended to identify the details of this "massive" CIA infiltration of academic research, and given anthropology's central role in international research, it seems the perfect field to consider.

The CIA channeled much of this money through "funding fronts"—legitimate foundations or CIA-controlled dummy corporations—to fund research of interest to the CIA (see *Newsweek* 1967; Wilford 2008). In 1967, the *Congressional Quarterly* wrote that

the CIA probably had used at least 46 foundations in an involved method of funneling funds to certain organizations. Under a method of transfer known as a "triple pass," the usual procedure was for the CIA to convey funds to "dummy" foundations established by the CIA to act as fronts for its activities. The "dummy" foundations then made grants to legitimate foundations. The legitimate foundations—which also handled other funds—then made grants to certain CIA-designated organizations, using the funds from the "dummy" foundations. However, the pattern varied in some instances. Press reports disclosed that there were some examples of direct grants by the "dummy" foundations to organizations (1967:271).

I have published several articles detailing how the CIA established funding fronts, such as the Human Ecology Fund, which during the 1950s and 1960s sponsored unwitting anthropologists and other social scientists studying the cultural mitigation of stress (and other topics), a subject which Human Ecology personnel pursued so they could apply knowledge collected from these grants to the CIA's secret 1963 KUBARK interrogation and torture manual (see Price 2007a, 2007b). I've interviewed anthropologists who unwittingly received CIA funds for this stress research, and none of them had any idea that the CIA was involved, much less that their work was being applied to interrogation and torture research.

The Church Committee also found that the CIA funded the publication of thousands of academic books; in most cases they used established presses, Praeger Press being one of the more famous documented examples (Church Committee 1976:198–99). The CIA funded the publication of works aligned with views it wished to propagate. Sometimes authors or presses were aware of CIA



sponsorship; other times they were not. Part of my research involves reading known CIA-funded books and doing content analysis, looking at authors' views that overlapped with the CIA's political positions.

I am also documenting instances of more than a dozen anthropologists who joined the CIA—either before, during, or after establishing academic careers, and sometimes passing through a revolving door that connected the agency to academia. Some anthropologists and archaeologists played major roles in CIA covert actions. For example, in 1953, Princeton archaeologist and architectural historian Donald Wilber (with Kermit Roosevelt) oversaw the CIA's covert Operation Ajax which overthrew Iran's popularly elected Prime Minister Mosaddegh and reinstated the Shah as an American political ally (Wilber 1954). Many CIA anthropologists, such as Charlotte Gower, Richard Starr, and Eugene Worman, had mundane desk jobs as CIA analysts or other functionary positions; other jobs were more adventuresome.<sup>1</sup> To mention one extremely dramatic example, in 1949–1950 CIA operative and future anthropologist Frank Bessac undertook a daring journey with CIA agent Douglas Mackiernan, being chased by the Communist Chinese overland from inner Mongolia to Tibet while carrying top-secret information about the Soviet Union's first atomic weapons tests. When Mackiernan was killed by overly vigilant border guards in Tibet, he became the first CIA agent (represented by a "star" on the wall at the entrance of CIA Headquarters in Langley) killed in the line of duty (Bessac and Bessac 2006; Laird 2002).

Anthropologists sometimes used fieldwork as cover for CIA work, sometimes the CIA used agents posing as anthropologists to collect intelligence, and sometimes non-CIA anthropologists were wrongly accused of CIA connections. As colonial nations gained independence in the years after the Second World War, the CIA and Pentagon had a desperate hunger for knowledge of how communism was being received by the villagers of these newly independent nations. For example, in 1950, in Indonesia, Yale University ethnographer Raymond Kennedy spent months conducting rapid ethnographic assessments of postcolonial changes in rural Indonesia, interviewing villagers on a range of topics, from shifts in quality of life to attitudes favoring communism (Kennedy 1953). Kennedy was assassinated on April 27, 1950, under the cloud of accusations that he was a CIA agent. Although his wartime service in the OSS and the nature of the information collected in his field notes, and the writings of others, indicate this was a likely possibility, his CIA ties remain open to interpretation (Marshack 1952; Winks 1996:50–51). Within four months of Kennedy's death, however, the Viking Fund provided fast-track funding for "recently resigned" CIA agent Lloyd Millegan to travel to Indonesia, posing as an anthropologist, to undertake the sort of ethnographic inquiries that Kennedy had been pursuing when he was assassinated. Millegan's 1950 Viking Fund application (Figure 1) makes it clear that he was fresh from the CIA when he applied, and was without an academic affiliation, yet Viking Fund Director of Research Paul Fejos approved the project upon receipt (Figure 2)—even though Millegan's letters of recommendation did not arrive for several more weeks (VFA, Millegan File). My interview with Millegan's son verifies that he was using the Viking Fund as a cover for CIA operations that were designed to continue Kennedy's work (DP interview with Kris Millegan, October 28, 2010).

6 September 1950  
 6 SEP 1950  
*B - Allen ...  
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 p 9/10/50*

To: The Viking Fund  
 14 East 71st Street  
 New York 21, N.Y.

From: Lloyd S. Millegan

Subject: Petition for Grant-in-Aid

1. Name Lloyd S. Millegan

2. Address Box 504 Fairfax, Virginia

3. Academic Background

1935-36 Linfield College McMinnville, Oregon  
 1936-37 University of Shanghai Shanghai, China  
 1937-39 Linfield College McMinnville, Oregon B.A. Degree in History  
 1939-42 American University Graduate School Washington, D.C.  
 Pre-doctoral work in International Affairs

Research Training and Experience

1940-41 Library of Congress Washington, D.C. Social Science Analyst Legislative Reference Service

1941-43 Office of Strategic Services Research and Analysis Branch Far East Division Research Analyst

1943-46 US Army Assistant to Dr. J.R. Hayden, Civil adviser and Consultant on Philippine Affairs at General MacArthur's Headquarters. Assistant Chief and later Chief of Philippine Research and Information Section, G.H.Q.

1946-50 Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. Research Analyst and Chief of Southeast Asia Branch.

1950- President, Pacific Books, Inc.

4. Title of Project

*To be followed by similar surveys in Burma, Thailand, Malaya and Indochina.*

"Survey of Anthropological Studies in Indonesia since Independence and Prospects for Future Studies". To be followed by similar surveys in Burma, Thailand, Malaya and Indochina.

Figure 1. Lloyd S. Millegan's application to the Viking Fund dated 6 September 1950 (VFA, Millegan File)



VIKING FUND, INC. COPY

(FOR AUDITING PURPOSES, KINDLY SIGN AND RETURN  
THIS COPY TO THE VIKING FUND.)  
September 8, 1950

To: Mr. Lloyd S. Millegan, President  
Pacific Books, Inc.  
Box 504  
Fairfax, Virginia  
*file*

Dear Mr. Millegan:

It is my pleasure to inform you that the Board of Directors of the Viking Fund approved the grant described in the Resolution set forth below.

There are no limitations or conditions attached to the conduct of projects aided by the Viking Fund, whose policy is to rely upon the integrity and scientific ability of its grantees. However, semi-annual reports on progress of research grants and Pre-Doctoral Fellowships, and a final report on accomplishments of all projects are requested, for submission to our Board of Directors.

A list of publications reporting results of research supported in whole or in part should be submitted not later than the first week of January, for inclusion in the Viking Fund's Annual Report. In addition, two or more copies of published material are requested for the Viking Fund's Research Library. Acknowledgment of Viking Fund aid is of course expected in all material released for publication.

I was instructed by our Directors to convey their best wishes for success.

Sincerely yours,

PAUL FEJOS, Director of Research

RESOLVED that a Viking Fund Pre-Doctoral Fellowship of \$1500 be awarded to Lloyd S. Millegan, Fairfax, Va. - To aid survey of anthropological studies in Indonesia since independence and prospects for future studies

eo It is understood that, upon termination of project, instruments, books, or other equipment purchased from grant-in-aid shall, at its option, revert to the Viking Fund, Inc.

RECEIVED:  
*Lloyd S. Millegan*

Check enclosed: \$1500.00 No. 6011 Date: *Sept. 13, 1950* Grant #508 *n*

Figure 2. Viking Fund notification of award to Lloyd S. Millegan dated 8 September 1950 (VFA, Millegan File)

Cold War interactions between the CIA and anthropologists sometimes involved professional associations. A decade ago I published an account documenting correspondence and FOIA records of the CIA's covert relationship with the American Anthropological Association's Executive Board in the early 1950s (Figure 3). This secret relationship gave the CIA access to the raw data on anthropologists' linguistic and cultural expertise collected for the Association's comprehensive membership roster (Price 2003a). In the AAA's archives, I recently discovered documents that the AAA unwittingly used funds provided by the Asia Foundation (revealed as a CIA funding front in 1967) to sponsor foreign AAA memberships in the 1950s and 1960s—a relationship that provided the CIA with contact information for these sponsored members (AAAP, Series 13, Box 73). The only thing surprising about the discovery of such documentary trails of CIA meddling is that these records have been preserved at levels allowing us to document these interactions so clearly.

But more than any other anthropological topic, it has been the false promise of using cultural anthropological knowledge to design effective means of counterinsurgency that has been the most enduringly attractive feature of anthropology for the CIA and the Pentagon. In the 1960s, the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) undertook a variety of counterinsurgency efforts, such as their study on "Witchcraft, Sorcery, Magic and other Psychological Phenomena and Their Implications on Military and Paramilitary Operations in the Congo," though these efforts to "weaponize" culture remained hidden from the public at the time (Price and Jureidini 1964).

The Church Committee found that, in the 1960s, the CIA channeled funds to unwitting scholars working in geographic regions of interest to the CIA. In many instances, it appears that scholars pursued questions and interpretations of their own design, yet the funding of one project over another shaped the form and direction of research that transformed the discipline in profound and unexamined ways.

There are discernable patterns from the 1950s and 1960s that parallel the processes by which military and intelligence funds were infused for big-budget Cold War physics projects since large, team-based, interdisciplinary research projects required long-term, regularized funding resources that frequently came with military or intelligence links. Cold War physics openly accepted military funds and did not concern itself with the military's uses of their work. Anthropologists Hugh Gusterson and Joe Masco show how physicists learned to segment their work into classified and declassified worlds at Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories, and other U.S. government-funded research facilities (Gusterson 1998; Masco 2006). In similar ways, anthropologists working on large projects learned to work in team environments, kept afloat in military and intelligence funds, on projects that likewise had militarized or intelligence applications. Anthropologists learned to segment their own understanding of this work, often acting as if their participation in the production of this political knowledge was somehow epiphenomenal or without ethical, political, or moral dimensions because it was self-conceived as the work of "science" or "humanistic interpretations."

## AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

MEMORANDUM NO. 6 from Executive Secretary  
 TO: Executive Board  
 SUBJECT: Roster of Anthropologists

Between April 9 and 11 negotiations leading to final arrangements for the compilation of a roster of Anthropologists were completed. The arrangement is as follows:

The C.I.A. will compile a preliminary questionnaire. The people who will do this have had experience with the rosters being made by the NSRB and they will be advised by anthropologists on the C.I.A. staff. This questionnaire will be discussed with the Executive Secretary, AAA and a final draft prepared for submission to the Association. This may be completed in time for the meeting of the Executive Board on May 9th.

At its meeting the Board will be requested to appoint a committee of Anthropologists to review the questionnaire and to add to it necessary or desirable data. The method of accomplishing the Committee's work is a problem for the Association to work out. In discussing this situation with other Executive Secretaries I have found that they recommend no meetings of the Committee. The most successful procedure involves a certain amount of preliminary correspondence. Following this the Executive Secretary or the chairman of the Committee meets with each man or with one or two at a time so to iron out difficulties. This idea I think may be feasible if the people involved are not too widely scattered.

The next problem is assembling the address list for the questionnaires. The Association's mailing list will form the basis for this. Others, such as the Archaeological Institute of America, the S.A.A., Society for Applied Anthropology, the Physical Anthropologists, and so on, should be included. The main problem here to avoid is duplication. It is proposed that these lists can be checked in Washington rather easily. Of course a certain amount of work will inevitably fall upon the Secretariat. Such additional work sets up problems in the office schedule but this one does not seem to be insurmountable.

Then [*sic*] the questionnaires have finally been returned they will be processed. That is, the cards will be punched. I have been assured that the punching will be done in such a way that it will be useful to either the NSRB or another project for the Social Sciences which appears to be developing in the ONR. (The ACLS is acting as liaison between the ONR and its constituent societies.) At any rate the Association will be presented with the punched cards. The cards can then be deposited with whatever agency seems to be most proper. In selecting the depository we have only to make sure that it is the one to which government people will look for information concerning the Social Sciences in general and Anthropology in particular.

[page 2]

As far as I have been able to determine the arrangement is as near "fool proof" as is possible under the circumstances. Furthermore in doing the job in this way we will be able to set up a really adequate roster, one which takes care of the many peculiarities of Anthropology. It seems to me that as long as we will have to have a roster eventually that it is better to do it this way than to get entangled with other agencies which have rather fixed ideas about what should be done. The job will be done with a minimum of cost to the Association. Actual cash outlay will be confined to postage which should not run over \$200.00. At the moment it does not appear that the necessary work in the Secretariat will add to the cost of running the office.

The general plan as written has not taken into consideration a proposal to request the assistance of the Division of Anthropology and Psychology, NRC. This proposal is written up as a separate item and is enclosed.

Frederick Johnson  
 Executive Secretary  
 April 17, 1951

Figure 3. Retyped (verbatim) version of 1951 memo from AAA Executive Secretary (AAP, Series 13, Box 73)

Two examples of large, team-based anthropological research projects with connections to military and intelligence agencies were the Modjokuto Project and the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF). As Steven Reyna (1998), Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1995), myself (Price 2003b), and others have shown, the 1950s Indonesian, multi-ethnographer Modjokuto Project had direct ties to MIT's then-CIA-funded Center for International Studies (CENIS). In the post-fieldwork environment at CENIS, where Clifford Geertz and others developed their analyses, other scholars and governmental employees with military and intelligence connections, such as Edward Shils, Guy Pauker, and former CIA economist Max Millikan, helped shape the analysis of postcolonial Indonesia (Blackmer 2002).<sup>2</sup> When I interviewed Geertz in 1995 about CENIS, where he wrote-up his Modjokuto research, he described a setting in which he was clearly working on the non-secretive, declassified side at the Center, while others with whom he was in regular contact, and who were interested in his research, were working on classified projects about which he knew nothing. Yet none of these political dynamics were reported at the time (see Price 2003b:388–89, 396 n. 15). Through supportive contacts such as these, Cold War social science was often passively influenced by American Cold War doctrine—as traces of Rostow's modernization theory influenced Geertz's notions of agricultural involution.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the Pentagon was HRAF's largest source of funds, making up about 85% of its revenue (the CIA was also a member funder); these Pentagon funds in part went to contracts for HRAF's Country Handbook series, but there were other, largely unexamined military ties (HRAF 1959:39). The coding of large amounts of HRAF data didn't come cheap, and these military and intelligence funding sources helped HRAF undertake the basic science at the core of its academic mission. In the early 1960s, HRAF established a special center on American University's Washington, D.C. campus; this center was linked to the Special Operations Research Office (SORO), the agency overseeing the short-lived Camelot counterinsurgency program of 1964 (Ford 1970:14–15). With less public notice, the Human Relations Area Files' analytical research categories for cataloging and interpreting ethnographic data were adapted as a tool by SORO (Figure 4) in the "M-VICO System of Counterinsurgency Taxonomy," which was designed to assist U.S. counterinsurgency campaigns against native people around the world (Price et al. 1966). Word of this militarized adaptation of HRAF did not reach the public at the time, but if it had, there would certainly have been a reaction of outrage and condemnation, such as occurred when anthropologists and the people living in affected nations learned of Camelot, and later when anthropologists learned their work was being appropriated by the CIA and U.S. Army for armed counterinsurgency operations in Thailand in 1970 (Horowitz 1967; Wakin 1992).

In 1971, the American Anthropological Association's annual meetings became the site of angry confrontations over the Association's unwillingness to condemn anthropologists working with intelligence agencies in Southeast Asia. As these political issues led to clashes within the membership, the Association's first ethics code emerged, codifying disciplinary standards of practice. This was a period of "reinventing anthropology," when many anthropologists critically

C-108 SIGNIFICANT INDIGENOUS PERSONAGES IN THE NATIONAL MOBILIZATION EFFORT—names and biographic information on individuals in public life, in religious activities, and in the security forces; rivalries, hostilities, and partisan ambitions among such personages; governmental and/or political functions of military leaders; nature of their military training and experience; attitudes attributed to specific individuals regarding the conduct of limited or sublimated warfare; etc. See also:			
Leadership traits . . . . .	157	Status of holy men . . . . .	792
Military leaders . . . . .	701	Leaders of religious activities . . . . .	793
Chief executive of state . . . . .	643	Biographies . . . . .	159
Local officials . . . . .	624	Legal and judicial personnel . . . . .	693
Headmen of kin groups . . . . .	61		
Chiefs of territorial divisions . . . . .	63		
C-109 DOMESTIC INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA AGENCIES—emphasis placed on psychological operations in overall government counterinsurgency planning; power exercised over the mass media by government; missions assigned to or assumed by the various mass media; degree of effective integration of effort with that of other agencies (e.g., with civic action efforts of police or military); target audiences by priorities; defects in information program; presence or absence of an articulated, government approved, in-country policy and/or ideology; etc. Information on organization of psyops companies in military will be filed under C-111. Psyops actually conducted by military units will be filed under C-171, and by police under C-174. See also:			
Molding of public opinion . . . . .	208	Newspapers and magazines . . . . .	204
Planned use of propaganda and psychological warfare . . . . .	723	Preparation of radio programs . . . . .	207
Dissemination of news and information . . . . .	203	Military psyops organization . . . . .	C-111
Police . . . . .	C-174	Military psychological operations . . . . .	C-171
Government regulation . . . . .	656		

Figure 4. Retyped (verbatim) version of selected codes in the “M-VICO System of Counterinsurgency Taxonomy” created by the Special Operations Research Office at American University to be used in conjunction with the HRAF data base (from Price et al. ca. 1966:183)

examined the politics of the profession; yet *professional organizations* generally refrained from confronting these political forces. Professional associations such as the AAA have always been far more comfortable addressing the ethical issues raised by anthropological research than they are in addressing the *political* issues.<sup>3</sup> The Vietnam War era showdown, fed by revelations that ethnographic research was being used for the subjugation of others, fostered a unique Cold War moment when political and ethical critiques were pushed to the fore—yet it would institutionally be the *ethical* critique (in the creation and formalization of the AAA’s Code of Ethics) that would have an institutional presence lasting beyond that historical moment.

## POLITICS VS. ETHICS

It is not difficult to understand why anthropologists during the 1940s and 1950s avoided openly addressing the *political* issues raised by using anthropology for warfare. As did other Americans, many anthropologists comfortably sided with the early Cold War politics of American exceptionalism-based, neocolonial expansionism, and those who had misgivings, generally learned to keep quiet. The serious attacks during the McCarthy era (of Communist “witch hunts”) on American anthropologists advocating racial, gender, and economic



equality demonstrate the pressures on the AAA and other organizations not to fundamentally address the political issues raised by harnessing anthropology for warfare in general, or even to differentiate between using anthropology to support or to oppose fascism. Although only about a dozen anthropologists appeared before loyalty or security hearings to face accusations of disloyalty, the impact of these hearings spread throughout the discipline as all anthropologists became initiates in the McCarthy era rituals of self-censorship, learning to professionally disengage from political processes that challenged dominant American notions of segregation, stratified wealth, rapid militarization, gender stratification, international neocolonialism, and other forms of social injustice. By these measures, McCarthyism was a smashing success (Price 2004).

The American Anthropological Association has long maintained that it is a “professional association,” not a “political association,” even though it has long taken political positions: assisting the waging of some wars (notably the Second World War), advocating for policies on issues such as anti-racist legislation, economic assistance to the poor, equal marriage rights, and gender equity. Instead of confronting the core *political* issues raised when military and intelligence agencies used anthropology, the discipline demarcated standards of practice in discussions of “ethics,” which established standards of “best practice” (e.g., voluntary informed consent, do no harm, disclosure of funding sources) that avoided confronting the political contexts in which the anthropological inquiry was immersed.

The end of the Second World War presented a unique opportunity for American anthropologists to stop and consider the political, moral, and ethical implications of collecting ethnographic knowledge about other cultures and then using it to manipulate or defeat those cultures. Rather than trying to untangle these difficult issues, the discipline avoided confronting them altogether. This avoidance would come back to haunt the discipline, as anthropology confronted unresolved issues over the politics of linking anthropology to warfare in Vietnam, Thailand, and elsewhere.

## FIVE FACTORS

Here, I identify five factors that contributed to the ease with which American anthropologists aligned their work with the interests with those of the National Security State during the course of the Cold War’s first two decades: impenetrable secrecy, avoidance of political critiques, viewing the Cold War through a WWII lens, the seductive distractions of funding, and intentional silences.

### *Impenetrable Secrecy*

Obviously, because many of the Pentagon’s and CIA’s interactions were secret and funded by pass-through agencies, such as the Human Ecology Fund or the Asia Foundation, most anthropologists never knew that the CIA was the source of research funds.<sup>4</sup>

### *Avoiding Political Critiques While (Eventually) Focusing on Ethics*

To gauge how professional associations, notably the American Anthropological



Association (AAA), avoided differentiating between the complex political issues raised by Allied and Axis anthropologists' engagement with the Second World War, consider the findings of the AAA's 1946 "Committee to Investigate the Possibility of Strengthening Non-Nazi Anthropologists in Enemy Countries" (*American Anthropologist* 48:319). This pivotal moment in anthropology's postwar development seems removed from disciplinary memory—a moment of opportunities lost with implications stretching to the present.

The committee members' wartime experiences were highly representative of the AAA general membership: (Chair) Carleton Coon and Gregory Bateson had been in the OSS during the war—both had undertaken dangerous field missions (Bateson in Ceylon and Burma; Coon in Morocco, and he was later seriously wounded in Europe); Earl Count taught human anatomy during the war, training military surgeons; Melville Herskovits contributed to the Ethnogeographic Board; and Alfred Métraux studied the impacts of Allied bombing on German morale for the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Price 2008; Sade 1997).

The committee first tried to determine which anthropologists in "enemy or enemy-occupied countries had been on our side and which opposed us," but they soon abandoned trying to make such determinations because they did not feel qualified to delineate who had and who had not actually been Nazi collaborators. The committee was faced with conflicting reports identifying Nazi collaborators. Some accusations appeared to carry out personal vendettas; other claims were difficult to evaluate because, for example, as the 1947 report put it: "Frenchmen are having great sport accusing each other of being collaborators" (*American Anthropologist* 49:353).<sup>5</sup> Coon's committee explained the decision to abandon adjudicating these matters, citing the complicity of American anthropologists in similar wartime actions—a choice based on unexamined assumptions conflating research practices and applications with political differences that left American anthropology unable to differentiate the various applications of Allied anthropology from Nazi anthropology's support of fascism and genocide. This was a serious mistake.

In rationalizing the decision to not investigate the extent of Nazi anthropology, Chairman Coon reported that, "we considered that if a German served in the armed forces of his country he was no more guilty from our point of view than those of us who had done the same thing. At first glance, we considered blackballing those who had used their positions for propaganda, but we soon realized that a great number of our own anthropologists had done the same thing and if we had supported that course of action we would have had to condemn some of our own colleagues" (*American Anthropologist* 49:353). Given committee member Gregory Bateson's OSS wartime propaganda work, (work that he later regarded as misguided), he might himself have been subjected to such condemnations by anyone not differentiating between the political causes of the Fascists and those of the Allies (see Price 1998). Such political distinctions do not excuse flawed ethical choices, yet they were key motivational forces guiding some who made those choices.

The committee decided that if "special cases" of anthropologist collaborators became known, they would then attempt to determine which anthropologists

had been Nazi collaborators. Yet no one on the committee looked for these “special cases”; if they had, they would have found a broad collection of Nazi anthropologists advancing their careers by directly falsifying scientific reports.

Although committee members lacked the expertise needed to undertake a prolonged investigation of German anthropologists’ war activities, they could have recommended the formation of a new committee composed of anthropologists with the needed skills. As the recent work of anthropologist Gretchen Schafft reveals, large numbers of Nazi anthropologists were directly involved in writing the Nazi Racial Laws that were instrumental in justifying the Holocaust: German anthropologists distorted physical anthropological findings to suit the Nazi cause. Given that Coon’s committee avoided even singling out Josef Mengele (who was professionally trained in anthropology) as a “special case” of active anthropologist collaboration, it is difficult to image what a Nazi anthropologist would have had to accomplish to garner specific condemnation (Schafft 2004:183).

The committee’s failure to include any Jewish members of the Association reinforced a willingness to avoid confronting the basic political, ethical, and moral differences between the varied applications of wartime anthropology by U.S. and Nazi anthropologists, but this sort of willful avoidance of considering the political context of specific anthropological applications, in this case egregious misapplications of anthropology, left the door open for the uncritical postwar military-intelligence adaptation of anthropological knowledge for a broad range of political ends.

It is difficult to interpret the committee’s latent function as anything other than providing administrative closure to the lingering misgivings about the abuses of anthropology during the war. I understand a desire at the war’s end to want to “move on” and not keep dwelling on the past, but from the vantage point of the present, the ease with which the AAA abandoned trying to determine what actions Nazi anthropologists had taken during the war, and their avoidance of delineating the political, moral, or ethical differences between Allied and Axis war activities, is startling. Their decision not to differentiate between using anthropology to advance fascism, racial discriminatory laws, and the Holocaust and using it to liberate occupied lands (obviously these are politically contested notions, yet even with their complexities, they have utility) expressed a strange postwar disconnect that hid behind such a radical form of relativism that it failed to make any political, ethical, or moral judgment over the uses of anthropology during the war. When this committee abandoned their charge, they repressed the sort of elementary *political* and ethical discussions that have come with each new military campaign seeking anthropological knowledge to dominate others. This return of the repressed has become a recurrent theme in a half-century of anthropological debates.

This decision to withdraw from a critical reflection of what it meant to apply anthropology to political projects seeking the control, dehumanization, and extermination of others was an important moment for American anthropology, a moment in which the discipline blinked and then withdrew into a posture of cultural relativism that failed to differentiate ethics, politics, and morality. Abandoning these questions opened the door for a host of troubling interactions

among anthropologists, the CIA, and Pentagon throughout the Cold War. It is not that deciding the political issues embedded in particular military or intelligence uses of anthropology could have been simply divined, or that anthropologists would somehow agree on these complex political issues, but the decision to ignore this political discourse solved nothing. In many ways, the silence over these issues created new problems. The failure to acknowledge the presence of political forces enabled the discipline to avoid engaging in a process of examination—a process whose answers would not necessarily have been those of contemporary critical anthropologists, yet this process could have impacted the ways in which postwar anthropology so easily integrated with military and intelligence developments of the Cold War period.

### *Viewing the Cold War through a WWII Lens*

For most postwar Americans, it was difficult to interpret the early Cold War's military and political developments as being separate from political contexts of the Second World War. But American Cold War foreign policy had shifted from defense to offense, as National Security Council Directive 68 and George Kennan's Policy Planning Study 23 launched forms of American expansionism that transformed the globe into a Risk game board where hearts, minds, debts, and loyalties were all in play (Gaddis 1993; Kennan 1948).

The ways in which American anthropologists in the late 1940s and the 1950s used their experiences in the Second World War to contextualize Cold War policies are crucial elements needed to understand how American anthropology aligned so much of its orientation with policy agendas supporting American hegemonic expansion over the rights of self-determination of other nations.

Even though America's Cold War political goals were fundamentally different than those of the Second World War, these shifts were not apparent for many living through this transition. America's Cold War shift to a global super power interested in protecting markets and developing patron-client relations with the underdeveloped world was not apparent to many anthropologists during the early Cold War years.

This historical shift can be easily discerned with hindsight, but for most of those living through these changes in motivations and transformations of relationships, preexisting lenses of interpretation anchored in past practices are most often used to explain political developments as they unfolded. Thus, soon after the CIA was formed in 1947, when it began subverting democratic movements not to its institutional liking in Italy, Iran, Guatemala, and elsewhere, the most common frame of American analysis remained the past war, not the present one. It was "natural" that many anthropologists viewed calls from the same types of governmental agencies in which they had served during the "Good War" as being an extension of this work. Notions of the CIA as a "rogue elephant," or of American imperialism, were far from the consciousness of most American anthropologists in the 1940s and 1950s, so many of them thought nothing of trends aligning their work with these agencies.

### *The Seductive Distractions of Funding*

The postwar years brought new, previously unimaginable levels of funding

for anthropology—funding that transformed the discipline in ways that made it prosper into a golden age of theory and global fieldwork, yet this anthropology grew in ways linked to larger Cold War political developments. Concerns over capturing new, cascading levels of funds led the American Anthropological Association to undertake a substantial reorganization that created a central, broad, professional association positioned to advocate for money from newly available public and private funds. Within the AAA, peace between anthropology's four subfields was explicitly negotiated, with the olive branch (wrapping the sacred bundle) appearing as the promise of a juggernaut large enough to be influential as well as centrally organized and based in Washington, D.C., where its representatives merited seats at the table with the Cold War's rich paymasters.

The origins of governmental programs funding anthropologists' fieldwork and language study programs were explicitly created with justifications of increasing Cold War preparedness. These programs included the National Science Foundation, Title VI, Pentagon-linked "Area Study" programs, the Defense Foreign Language Program, and so on. The Fulbright program was originally linked to the *real politik* concerns of the postwar world—spending foreign soft currencies earned through grain sales (especially wheat), while encouraging détente through cultural exchange. Most of these programs had no directives obligating anthropologists receiving these funds to future governmental work (unlike today's Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program [PRISP], National Security Education Program [of the Department of Defense: NSEP], Intelligence Community Scholars Program [ICSP], and others), yet the congressional justifications of these expenditures explicitly connected them to generating knowledge that would help meet general defense needs.

Congressional hearings in the 1970s clarified that distinctions between private and governmental funding were at times illusionary and were poor indicators of whether the CIA or Pentagon was covertly directing research funds (Church Committee 1976; Pike Committee 1991). The private foundations that sponsored anthropology during this period often had close ties to military and intelligence agencies. The most powerful private foundations—Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller—regularly worked in concert with the Department of State when developing research funding plans that overlapped the concerns of academia and the state. The most obvious and extraordinary example of this process during the Cold War is the Ford Foundation's extensive funding of American research in Indonesia, which studied political stability and the threat of communism (Ransom 1975; Roelofs 2003:165–66; Saunders 1999:135–39).

### *Intentional Silences*

Not all anthropologists in the 1950s were unaware of, or silent about, the direct impacts of the national security state on shaping anthropology. Some anthropologists wrote critical analyses of the ways in which Cold War funding and pressures from military sectors shaped the development of anthropological and area studies research. Perhaps the clearest example of these processes can be seen in the short but brilliant anthropological career of Jerome Rauch. A decade ago, I corresponded with Rauch about the political tensions and pressures he

experienced at Columbia University in the 1950s, and the difficulties he faced as an African-American anthropology graduate student in 1955, after he published a profound critique of how the Cold War funding opportunities were shaping American anthropology. In 2000, Rauch wrote me that after his critique was published, anthropologist Julian Steward “told me that I was unemployable, and, trying to face reality, I enrolled in library school” (JR to DP 12/13/2000). I became friends with Rauch during the last year of his life, and in February 2001 he sent me a draft of a paper he was preparing, discussing how his inquiries into the ways in which Cold War funding opportunities for African Studies were shaping disciplinary discourse led to him being forced to leave anthropology. Rauch wrote:

My goodbye to anthropology was an article [titled] “Area Institute Programs and African Studies,” published in the Fall 1955 issue of the *Journal of Negro Education*. It was an examination of the WWII and postwar government-initiated reorganization of academic social studies under the rubric of area institutes in order to serve the interests of the Cold War, now understood more accurately by later generations as the national security state. This transformed academic research into applied science, and reconfigured social research into ideology.

I had no great expectation that this analysis would be received as front page news, but I was taken aback by the way it was totally rejected and assigned to oblivion (JR to DP 2/22/01).

Rauch anticipated the work of Bruce Cumings, Seymour Melman, Noam Chomsky, Sigmund Diamond, Laura Nader, and others, including myself, by several decades as he traced the roots of the Cold War’s area study centers to their World War II beginnings.

Rauch described area study centers as “the mantle of world hegemony [that] provides the propelling force behind foreign area research” (Rauch 1955:413). His analysis focused on the political economy of Cold War America and found that the quest for control of Third World wealth was based on the coveting of “Raw materials and investment opportunities, strategic and military import, the status quo and/or colonialism” (Rauch 1955:422). And he observed the ways in which American social science was adapting to assist these goals. Rauch criticized prevailing claims that colonialism in Africa had brought positive impacts, and he was extremely critical of the ways in which the well-funded and prestigious area study centers produced social theories that rationalized new forms of colonial relationships.

He critiqued the ways in which area study centers’ funding compromised academic freedom for political ends, asking (Julian Steward’s) rhetorical question, “If area programs have other purposes, which are purely scientific rather than political, what are they?” (Rauch 1955:424).

Rauch’s analysis of the political economy of anthropology and area studies generated harsh responses from his professors in Columbia’s anthropology

department, from which Gene Weltfish had recently been fired after being attacked by Senator Joseph McCarthy for her critiques of American imperialism (Price 2004:109–35). Rauch withdrew from the field; he viewed his marginalization as a reward for his critique. Jerome Rauch died in 2001. A few months before his death, he wrote me he had no regrets about leaving the field; he had enrolled in library school, worked with W. E. B. DuBois, and served as a medical librarian at several prestigious institutions (JR to DP 2/22/01).

### CONCLUSIONS: THE BORDERS OF DISCIPLINARY PERDITION

I do acknowledge a sixth reason why early Cold War anthropologists did not critically consider how their work aligned with military interests. Anthropologists have long observed that in many societies there is a general unawareness of the ways in which economic forces influence individuals' idioms of daily life and of the ways that these forces organize the social worlds people inhabit. The Nuer don't seem to think it unusual that their religious or structural world is organized around an idiom of cattle, just as the pastoral ancient Hebrew people favored metaphors of shepherds for their Lord; the Yanomami explain the anthropologists who visit them as coming from worlds that are morphed versions of the Yanomami homeland. And I suppose it is no more unusual that Cold War anthropologists would remain so unconscious of their own linkage with the military-industrial complex that was taking over their economy. As part of the ideological system, science (including social science) is impacted by the political economy, structure, and infrastructure of the society in which it is produced, and the awareness of these impacts can remain obscured. I say this not as one who bashes sciences in some postmodern sense, but as a latter-day, reformed positivist who recognizes that the falsifiability of science offers the possibility of a unique way of knowing, but also acknowledges the influence of the economic base over superstructure as a force so strong that it creates blind spots.

All cultures have their own ethnocentric blind spots. In this sense, it is understandable that American anthropologists in the 1950s and 1960s would remain unconscious of their own articulation with the sprawling military industrial complex that President Eisenhower belatedly acknowledged as he slipped out the door in January 1961. Anthropologist Catherine Lutz writes about the processes through which the growth of American militarization (which today makes up 49% of the planet's military spending) has progressed to a condition she refers to as the new "military normal," where we accept the spread of military and intelligence agencies into our daily lives, classrooms, airports, daycare centers, and private spaces as if this last "healthy" sector of our economy had always been present and funded at such colossal levels (Lutz 2010).

This early Cold War history has importance for anthropology in the present. While I have tried to explain why early Cold War anthropologists were not more critical of disciplinary links to military and intelligence agencies; I have not addressed why anthropologists still have not seriously studied or acknowledged the details of this history—though I suspect the reasons in part have to do with the dynamics that led Jerome Rauch to abandon his pursuit of anthropology. This



historical vacuum today serves a renaissance of post-9/11 programs designed to usher the CIA and Pentagon ventures back onto our cash-strapped university campuses. With little awareness of the ways in which the influence of these agencies altered the production of knowledge in the past, new CIA “Centers of Academic Excellence” (CAC) and other intelligence centers are being established on campuses across the country. And if professional associations remain corralled, limiting their concerns to ethical (and avoiding political) considerations, we can expect military and intelligence agencies to reassert their dominance on the field of anthropology, as new top-down science models reminiscent of Soviet-era directed science and other campus programs enact more constrictive forms of scholarship than were produced during the Cold War projects I study (Price 2010, 2011:59–66).

But in many ways, the CIA and Pentagon’s latest, more “open” efforts to influence the academic production of knowledge will lead to inferior knowledge than was generated by their alignments with academia in the early Cold War. Although the ethical, moral, and political problems associated with the Cold War’s covert funding of academics are huge when compared with today’s strategies of front-loading military and intelligence funding (with programs such as the Pentagon’s Minerva Initiative, or the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program—which secretly places students linked with the CIA and other agencies in our classrooms) for individuals and projects already aligned with the assumptions, questions, and answers sought by these agencies. Today’s post-9/11 practice of increasingly linking students with military and intelligence agencies at the beginning of their academic careers adopts a model of controlled science that is rapidly spreading the institutionally limiting forms of “groupthink” dominating these agencies outward into our universities with each new “Intelligence Center.” Today’s rapidly expanding model of government-controlled social science increasingly has direct links to student “debt-service.”

The decision by anthropological associations after World War II to primarily focus on *ethical* rather than *political* elements of anthropological practice continues to have deep impacts on anthropology. For example, a recent AAA commission (of which I was a member, from 2006 to 2009) investigated an increasing range of engagements between anthropologists and military and intelligence agencies—the most prominent of which is the Human Terrain Systems program, which embeds ethnographers with combat units in Iraq and Afghanistan. After a few months’ discussions, as a committee we set aside (unresolved) political arguments concerning issues of anthropologists assisting military and intelligence agencies involved in invasions and occupations of sovereign nations and instead focused on evaluating how the AAA code of ethics related to specific actions of military anthropologists. As a committee, we chose to ignore the larger political issues raised when using anthropology for conquest, and while this approach produced some important findings (findings ranging from condemnations of Human Terrain System’s ethical failures to a recognition that many anthropological contributions to military and intelligence agencies fall within the ethical practices described in the AAA’s Code of Ethics), yet the political issues of using anthropology for conquest remained not only unresolved, but largely ignored by this process. We did

learn some important things about specific forms of military aligned anthropology, yet our decision to set aside the political questions of using anthropology in the service of a military linked with American hegemony remain fundamental to many anthropologists, and certainly to the peoples impacted by these policies.

It is not that anthropologists should abandon focusing on ethics: I would never argue that. Anthropologists *must* remain committed to ethical anthropology, but worrying about the details of ethical interactions between individuals within larger, unacknowledged political contexts in which anthropologists work alongside military forces invading and occupying foreign lands disconnects anthropology from the discipline's promise of holistic analysis. Anthropology's professional associations should continue to focus on ethics, but they also need to acknowledge and collectively forge policies of the appropriate political uses of anthropology.

The problem with focusing on professional ethics while institutionally ignoring political dimensions is that, logically, one can be an ethical anthropologist (gaining voluntary informed consent, use pseudonyms, etc.) while producing data consumed by politically oppressive military projects, and despite a careful, conscious adherence to high ethical standards, the resulting work assists political oppression. Simply put: one could technically be a "good" ethical anthropologist contributing to a military campaign that is violating human rights. Such scenarios conjure images of Weber's "iron cage of rationality" as individual functionaries surrender their moral and political responsibility for a checklist of ethical practices (Weber 1958:182). The past thirty years have produced a rich critical literature exploring anthropology's relationship to power, colonialism, and the power of military and economic force, yet there remains a systemic disconnect in anthropology's professional associations in applying this scientific knowledge to try to impact how anthropology's knowledge is applied.

One of my hopes in writing about these Cold War interactions between anthropology and military and intelligence agencies is to critically evaluate this past so that anthropology can better navigate recurrent roles, and ongoing pressures to align our work with militarized political projects that reappear as manifestations in the present.

## NOTES

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1. For Gower, see Lepowsky 2000; for Starr, see Saxon 1994; for Worman, see AAA 1948.

2. Shils, Pauker, and Millikan were all thanked and acknowledged by Geertz in his early work (see Geertz 1963a:xvii, 1963b:vii).

3. Professional ethics are concerned with "best practices," with ethics codes advocating that researchers protect the well-being of research subjects, while political considerations focus more directly on power relations and political uses of anthropological research.

4. Yet after disclosures of CIA funding were made public in the press and by congress in 1967 and 1975, there was little systematic scholarly investigation of the details or impact of this funding.

5. This laissez-faire attitude toward Nazi collaborators was not broadly shared by European anthropologists: the CIA's archives contain records of the OSS interviewing Claude Lévi-Strauss in New York City a month after the Nazi surrender. Lévi-Strauss told the OSS agent that, with the war over in France, "it might have been better to kill 50,000 collaborationists immediately" than to face these quislings in the years to come or let the French judicial system deal with them (Mehlman 2000:181).

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